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Abstract 
Deviant consumer behaviour in the marketplace is an ongoing problem causing harm to 
the organisation, employees, and other consumers. To address this problem, this study 
explores consumer perceptions of right and wrong using the novel concept of a deviance 
threshold – the mental line in the sand dictating right and wrong. Using consumer-based 
interviews with a card-sort activity, findings supported and extended dimensions 
proposed to explain why some behaviours are perceived as more serious or unethical than 
others. Moreover, why specific neutralisation techniques are used and how they affect 
categorisations of behaviours within an individual’s deviance threshold is explained. This 
study offers alternative strategies tailored to challenging consumer justifications to curb 
deviance. Implications support abandoning the universal approach to deterrence. 
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Where Do Consumers Draw the Line? Factors Informing Perceptions and 
Justifications of Deviant Consumer Behaviour 
 
Introduction 
Most individuals draw a mental line in the sand representing their perceptions of 
what behaviours are right and wrong in a given context. This line is conceptualised as an 
individual’s deviance threshold. In a consumer setting, law and organisational policies 
are in place to signal right and wrong consumer behaviours. Yet, despite the law and 
organisational policies in place, consumers continue to undertake illegal behaviours and 
behaviours that violate organisational policies (Daunt & Harris,2012). For instance, in 
2013, $AU112 billion was lost globally to fraudulent returns by customers (Jager, 2013). 
Fraudulent returns can include returning a shoplifted item (illegal) and lying about the 
item being a gift as a reason to return (policy violation). While some consumers may 
draw on law and policy to guide their actions, there seems to be evidence of consumers 
drawing on multiple factors to decide what they perceive as right and wrong, or 
normative. Normative behaviours are those that society generally agrees on as being 
acceptable, yet there may not be a law or policy formally stipulating its acceptability. Past 
research has shown that consumers vary in their perceptions of the ethicality (Neale & 
Fullerton, 2010) and wrongness (Wilkes, 1978) of different consumer behaviours, based 
on how consumers rate their perceptions on Likert scales. The factors underpinning why 
these perceptions exist have not yet been explored: identifying them could be used to 
understand the formation of the individual’s deviance threshold to better understand the 
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complexities of deviant consumer behaviour (DCB), ensuring better deterrence strategies 
are employed. 
Consumer behaviours that are against the law or regulations or that violate the 
generally accepted norms of conduct are known as DCBs (Fullerton & Punj, 1993). DCB 
can negatively affect employees, organisational assets, and other consumers (Fullerton & 
Punj, 1997, 2004). A behaviour that is defined as deviant by external measures could still 
be regarded as acceptable by a consumer if it falls within their deviance threshold: in 
other words, if the consumer perceives the behaviour to be justified, evidenced by the 
individual’s use of neutralisation techniques. Neutralisation techniques are 
disengagement tools used to reduce anticipatory or actual cognitive dissonance 
experienced from performing an act that contradicts with one’s underlying values and 
beliefs (Festinger, 1957; Sykes & Matza, 1957). Understanding the underlying factors 
informing an individual’s deviance threshold, and how these factors could relate to the 
kinds of justifications consumers use to neutralise their DCBs, is valuable for creating 
effective deterrence strategies tailored to challenge the justifications enabling enactment 
of DCBs. Developing tailored deterrence strategies for organisations is important for 
marketing managers as deterrence is no longer considered to have a universal effect on 
individuals (Worrall, Els, Piquero, & TenEyck, 2014). The research for this current paper 
recommends the abandonment of a ‘one-size-fits-all approach to deterrence’ in line with 
criminological research on criminal deterrence strategies (Worrall et al., 2014, p. 341). 
The first aim of this paper is to explore the factors informing an individual’s 
deviance threshold. Drawing on existing conceptual literature, five factors are identified 
that are likely to inform an individual’s deviance threshold (e.g. outcomes, intent). Data 
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from a series of qualitative interviews are used to support, reject, and/or extend on these 
factors. The second aim is to extend on the work of Harris and Daunt (2011), by 
examining how underlying factors (e.g. outcomes, intent) in consumer perceptions of 
behaviour acceptability inform the use of specific neutralisation techniques to justify 
perceptions of DCB. This will build a greater knowledge base on the use of these 
techniques, as called for in the consumer ethics literature (Vitell, 2003). The factors that 
inform the construction of an individual’s deviance threshold are mapped in this paper, 
and used to examine how neutralisation techniques affect mental placement of behaviours 
within that threshold. 
The paper first presents a review of neutralisation techniques and their impact on an 
individual’s deviance threshold, followed by a review of how behaviours are 
distinguished from one another. The qualitative research design is subsequently discussed 
and the results are presented. The paper concludes with a summary of the theoretical and 
practical implications of this research, and the limitations and future research 
opportunities. 
 
Neutralisation techniques and deviance thresholds 
Across a number of fields of research, including criminology, psychology, 
management, and marketing, neutralisation techniques have been suggested to facilitate 
the occurrence, maintenance, and escalation of deviant behaviour (e.g. Bandura,1991a; 
Bonner & O’Higgins, 2010; Harris & Dumas, 2009; Strutton, Vitell, & Pelton, 1994; 
Tenbrunsel & Messick, 2004; Zyglidopoulos, Fleming, & Rothenberg, 2009). 
Neutralisation techniques are required to resolve the conflict between wanting to perform 
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DCBs for some benefit, while not having to negatively update their self-concept – 
perception of oneself (Mazar, Amir, & Ariely, 2008). For most individuals there comes a 
point – the deviance threshold – at which they cannot justify a greater degree of DCB, as 
the magnitude of cognitive dissonance would be so large (Festinger, 1957; Mazar et al., 
2008). If an individual were to engage in behaviour beyond their own deviance threshold, 
they would need to negatively update how they perceive themselves: in other words, they 
would need to think badly of themselves. This goes against an individual’s inherent drive 
to maintain a positive self-concept (Blasi, 1984; Cialdini, 1988; Festinger, 1957; Mazar et 
al., 2008; Sirgy, 1982). The original framework of neutralisation techniques encompassed 
denial of responsibility, denial of injury, denial of victim, condemnation of the 
condemners, and appeal to higher loyalties (Sykes & Matza, 1957). Investigations have 
expanded on these original techniques and proposed defence of necessity (Minor, 1981), 
claim of entitlement (Coleman, 1994; McGregor,2008), normal practice (Coleman, 1994; 
Henry, 1990), claim of relative acceptability (Henry & Eaton, 1989), metaphor of ledger 
(Klockers, 1974), and justification by comparison (Cromwell & Thurman, 2003). 
Denial of responsibility is used when the individual deflects responsibility for the 
outcome of their behaviour to the external environment (Sykes & Matza, 1957). 
Individuals using this neutralisation technique perceive themselves as being acted upon, 
rather than acting on their own accord (Sykes & Matza, 1957). This creates 
disengagement between an individual and their actions. While denial of responsibility 
argues ‘I didn’t mean to do it’, defence of necessity alternatively argues ‘I had no other 
choice but to do it’, the act was necessary to achieve a goal (Harris & Daunt, 2011; 
Minor, 1981). 
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The claim of entitlement technique, originally proposed by Coleman (1994) in his 
book on white-collar crime, was suggested by McGregor (2008) to also be evident in the 
consumer context. McGregor (2008) suggested that claim of entitlement is used to justify 
benefit from enacting a DCB. However, McGregor’s (2008) arguments were unsupported 
by empirical data and thus there is an opportunity to find evidence for it in the consumer 
context. 
Denial of injury is used when the individual perceives their behaviour is not harming 
others. Hence, the individual assesses the wrongfulness of an action by the level of injury 
or harm resulting from the behaviour (Sykes & Matza, 1957). Another technique used to 
similarly deflate the negative consequences incurred by the victim is the claim of relative 
acceptability technique (Henry & Eaton, 1989), arguing there are ‘much worse 
individuals than me’ (Harris & Daunt, 2011). The claim of relative acceptability 
technique is limited to interpersonal comparisons. In contrast, the justification by 
comparison technique judges behaviours against one another (Cromwell & Thurman, 
2003). Behaviours are rationalised as being acceptable in comparison to more serious 
forms of DCB that exist for anyone to perform. The metaphor of the ledger technique is 
used to make comparisons between different behaviours the individual themselves 
actually performs (Klockers, 1974). The metaphor of the ledger technique suggests that 
behaviours can be deemed acceptable on the basis that the individual’s good behaviour 
offsets their deviant actions. This means individuals can use their good behaviour as a 
credit for bad behaviour. A field of research is growing around this concept of crediting 
behaviour (‘moral credits’) (e.g. Merritt, Effron, & Monin, 2010). 
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The denial of victim technique is commonly employed when responsibility has been 
taken, and injury has been acknowledged, yet the individual perceives the injury to be 
justified – ‘a rightful retaliation or punishment’ (Sykes & Matza,1957, p. 668). The 
victim could also be unknown or physically absent to the individual (Sykes & Matza, 
1957). The absence of an identifiable victim makes it difficult for the consumer to feel 
empathetic (Jenni & Loewenstein, 1997), facilitating enactment of the DCB. 
The condemnation of the condemner’s technique is used by an individual to shift 
attention to those condemning the individual’s behaviour (Sykes & Matza, 1957). This 
technique is commonly used in the public arena, when opposing groups attack the 
wrongfulness of the others’ behaviours to deflect from their own questionable 
behaviours. The technique works on the premise that it is unfair to condemn one person, 
without condemning all the individuals who engaged in similar actions (Coleman, 1994). 
A similar perspective is offered by the neutralisation technique of normal practice, an 
extension of Sykes and Matza’s (1957) framework, which rationalises that a behaviour is 
acceptable if it is prevalent in society – ‘everybody else is doing it’ (Coleman, 1994; 
Henry, 1990). As normative behaviours are suggested to reflect the popularity and social 
approval of an act (Park & Smith, 2007), the use of the normal practice technique seeks 
to remove the presence of cognitive dissonance by arguing their actions are normative, 
not deviant. 
The final technique of appeal to higher loyalties is used to justify upholding a norm of 
a small sub-group of society at the cost of violating a wider societal norm (Sykes & 
Matza, 1957). A parent acting to protect their child at the expense of breaking the law 
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would use this neutralisation technique, holding their loyalty to their child as higher than 
their loyalty to obeying the law (Sykes & Matza, 1957). 
These neutralisation techniques enable performance of DCB by distorting the link 
between the individual’s actions and the consequences they cause (Bandura, 1991a, 
1991b, 1999). Disengagement from the consequences of one’s actions could cause an 
individual to engage in a behaviour originally considered by the individual to be 
unacceptable, without much distress (Bandura, 1991a, 1999; Mazar et al., 2008). To date, 
research has investigated the type of neutralisation technique used, relative to the 
behaviour being examined (Harris & Daunt, 2011; Hinduja, 2007; Morris & Higgins, 
2009) and the timing of its use – pre-and-post behaviour (Harris & Dumas, 2009). 
However, it remains unclear what motivates the use of a specific neutralisation technique. 
Neutralisation techniques explain why some DCBs are mentally positioned within an 
individual’s deviance threshold. However, it is unclear (1) what factors inform where the 
deviance threshold is positioned (i.e. where do consumers draw the line in the sand), and 
(2) how those factors inform the kinds of neutralisation techniques an individual uses to 
mentally retain DCBs within their deviance threshold, enabling them to be performed 
without the individual negatively updating their self-concept. This paper argues that the 
underlying factors influencing consumer perceptions of DCB are likely to inform the type 
of neutralisation techniques used, a different perspective from existing literature. Taking 
this alternate perspective means convergence of the results could lead to greater 
generalisability of the knowledge on the use of neutralisation techniques, or identify gaps 
in our knowledge. Five potential factors are identified in this paper as informing the 
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positioning of an individual’s deviance threshold, which could inform the use of a 
specific neutralisation technique. 
 
Factors informing the position of an individual’s deviance threshold 
Past research has used conceptual (e.g. Fullerton & Punj, 2004) or post-hoc empirical 
research (e.g. Muncy & Vitell, 1992) to categorise behaviours based on some common 
underlying element such as the degree of harm caused or the normative nature of the 
behaviour. Five overarching factors have been identified; (1) official classification of the 
behaviour (law and policy), (2) perceived risk, (3) norms, (4) intent, and (5) perceived 
outcomes. The five factors, along with their sub-dimensions, are outlined in Table 1. This 
paper synthesises and empirically validates existing conceptual factors identified in the 
literature as underpinning consumer perceptions of right and wrong. These are the factors 
proposed to inform the positioning of an individual’s deviance threshold. 
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Table 1. Summary of conceptual dimensions used to classify behaviours as distinct from one another 
Overarching factor Conceptual Dimensions Source 
Official Classification 
– law & policy 
- Regulated / Not regulated  
- Deceitful / Fraudulent act   
- Legal sanctions  
(Moschis & Cox, 1989) 
(Muncy & Vitell, 1992) 
(Fullerton & Punj, 2004) 
Perceived Risk  - Magnitude of consequences*  
- Probability of effect* 
- Temporal immediacy*  
(Jones, 1991) 
(Jones, 1991) 
(Jones, 1991) 
Norms - Normative/Deviant  
- Social consensus 
- Social sanctions 
(Moschis & Cox, 1989) 
(Jones, 1991) 
(Fullerton & Punj, 2004) 
Intent - Passive or active the consumer was in the act  
- Nature of the act  
(Muncy & Vitell, 1992) 
(Fullerton & Punj, 2004) 
Perceived Outcomes 
- Degree of harm 
- Probability of harm 
- Type of harm 
- How many affected 
- Direction of harm 
(victim) 
- Degree of harm 
- Type and degree of disruption  
- The perceived consequences of each alternative, for those involved  
- The (un)desirability of the consequence incurred by those involved  
- The probability of the harm being incurred by those involved  
- Concentration of effect (intensity of harm caused) 
- The importance of each party involved in the behaviour 
- Proximity (nearness to victim) 
(Muncy & Vitell, 1992) 
(Fullerton & Punj, 2004) 
(Hunt & Vitell, 1986) 
(Hunt & Vitell 1986) 
(Hunt & Vitell 1986) 
(Hunt & Vitell 1986; Jones, 1991) 
(Jones, 1991) 
Table 1 footnote: * If interpreted as effect on self (egoist) – then this can be interpreted as risk, if interpreted as effect on others (utilitarian) – then these can be interpreted as harm
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The first factor, official classification, refers to the law or organisational policy, 
which is used in society to formally categorise behaviours as acceptable or 
unacceptable. Scholars have proposed the presence of formal regulation as a means to 
distinguish between acceptable behaviours and DCBs (e.g. Amine & Gicquel, 2011; 
Fullerton & Punj, 2004; Moschis & Cox,1989; Muncy & Vitell, 1992; Vitell & 
Muncy, 2005). Current organisational deterrence strategies assume behaviours 
officially classified by law or policy as unacceptable will be agreed with, and 
complied with, by individuals. As such, Mitchell and Chan (2002) argue organisations 
should overtly stress the wrongness of a DCB to deter consumers. Yet this may be an 
ineffective approach, as some individuals do not internalise the morality on which 
laws or organisational policy are based (Cooter, 2000). In other words, if individuals 
perceive the law or policy to be unfair, or can justify violating it, they are more likely 
to engage in the DCB (Gregoire & Fisher, 2007; Yi & Gong, 2008). When a 
deterrence message (i.e. ‘It’s wrong, don’t do it’) contradicts an individual’s 
perception of the behaviour, the message may be ignored to avoid experiencing 
cognitive dissonance (Festinger,1957). Dissonance can subsequently be removed 
depending on the factor most salient in the individual’s perception of right and wrong, 
from the list discussed below. In order to remain effective at guiding perceptions of, 
and engagement in a specific behaviour, the official classification needs to be backed 
by punishment (Freeman, Liossis, & David, 2006), which leads to the second factor of 
perceived risk. 
When perceptions of risk are high, a specific behaviour is perceived to be 
unacceptable, due to the threat of punishment (Freeman et al., 2006). However, 
deterrence strategies that emphasise risk to deter DCB are only effective if the 
perceived certainty of apprehension is high, perceived severity of punishment is 
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proportionate to the DCB, and punishment is enacted swiftly (Akers & Sellers, 2004; 
Grasmick & Green, 1980). Most DCBs go undetected (Bandura, 1991a) due to the 
extensive costs associated with policing and punishing them (Lin, Hastings, & Martin, 
1994; Zetter, 2014). Therefore, a deterrent strategy relying on the threat of 
punishment could be ineffective at signalling to consumers that a specified behaviour 
is wrong. Where a DCB is not officially classified by law or policy as unacceptable, 
or where perceptions of risk are low or absent, individuals could rely on norms to 
inform their deviance threshold. 
Norms, the third factor, guide perceptions of DCB based on the perceived 
popularity and social approval of the act (Park & Smith, 2007). While norms are 
proposed by a number of scholars as a means to distinguish between DCBs in their 
degree of acceptability (e.g. Amine & Gicquel, 2011; Moschis & Cox, 1989), what 
constitutes normative consumer behaviours varies among individuals. Individuals will 
likely perceive normative behaviours as behaviours their peer group reinforces, while 
deviant behaviours are punished via social sanctions (Akers & Sellers, 2004). When 
social consensus – the level of agreement about an issue or behaviour – varies, it 
results in varying perceptions of DCBs and various DCBs being performed in the 
marketplace. When the social consensus is that a particular behaviour’s acceptability 
is low, uncertainty drives consumers to explore other psychological and external 
factors to guide their judgements. The behaviour classification literature identifies two 
additional factors consumers could rely on to inform their deviance thresholds: intent 
and perceived outcomes. 
The fourth factor identified as potentially influencing consumer perceptions is 
intent – the intention of the consumer performing the act. Consumer perceptions can 
be influenced by how passive or active the consumer is in committing the act (Muncy 
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& Vitell, 1992; Vitell & Muncy, 2005). If the action was actively deviant (e.g. giving 
misleading information) as opposed to passively deviant (e.g. not saying anything 
when receiving extra change), consumer perceptions of its acceptability will vary 
such that the more passive the act, the more acceptable it is perceived to be in 
comparison to active DCB. 
Finally, the perceived outcome of a particular behaviour, the fifth factor identified, 
could also be used to distinguish behaviours. Outcomes can involve consideration of 
the type and degree of harm towards an organisational or individual victim. Fullerton 
and Punj (2004) suggest that behaviours can be distinguished based on the type and 
degree of disruption, which aligns with degree of harm as proposed in the Consumer 
Ethics Scale (Vitell & Muncy, 2005). Interpretation of behavioural outcomes can be 
affected by proximity – the nearness an individual feels to the victim (Jones, 1991). 
Social distance is a relevant proximity measure in the consumer context. The greater 
the perceived social distance between the consumer and the organisation, the more 
likely the consumer will engage in DCB possibly causing harm to the organisation 
(Moore & Loewenstein, 2004). 
Combining these conceptual dimensions from the preceding typologies and 
frameworks to form five factors (official classification, risk, norms, intent, and 
outcomes) provides a foundation from which consumers’ deviance thresholds can be 
qualitatively explored. The research for this paper proposes that a varying number of 
factors are present in individual assessments of acceptability, which could lead to 
those individuals experiencing cognitive dissonance if factors salient in their 
perceptions are inconsistent with law, policy, and/or norms. This dissonance creates 
an opportunity for the individual to use neutralisation techniques to justify the mental 
positioning of DCBs within their deviance threshold (Figure 1). In other words, the 
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factors salient in consumer perceptions will likely inform the type of neutralisation 
technique the individual uses to justify their perceptions and behaviours. 
 
Figure 1. An individual’s deviance threshold – where the behaviours fall 
 
 
 
Method  
In order to map the factors that inform the construction of an individual’s deviance 
threshold, and examine how neutralisation techniques effect mental placement of 
behaviours within that threshold, 29 one-hour semi-structured in-depth interviews 
were conducted. During the interview, a card-sort activity was used to facilitate the 
exploration of the abstract concepts of right and wrong, using 30 consumer 
behaviours. Card sorting is a simple categorisation tool used to gain contextualised 
insights into consumer perceptions (Fincher & Tenenberg, 2005). Card sorts are 
grounded in Kelly’s (1955) Personal Construct Theory, which argues that ‘different 
people categorise the world differently, but with enough commonality to let us 
understand each other but enough differences to make us individuals’ (Upchurch, 
Rugg, & Kitchenham, 2001, p. 85). The categorisations that the respondents made 
during the card sort reflect their ‘internal mental representation’ of right and wrong 
behaviours (Fincher & Tenenberg, 2005, p. 90). A card sort was chosen over other 
sorting methods because of its simple nature, which enabled it to be used as a 
facilitative tool during the interviews. 
ACCEPTABLE 
BEHAVIOURS 
QUESTIONABLE AND 
UNACCEPTABLE BEHAVIOURS 
THAT CAN BE JUSTIFIED 
QUESTIONABLE AND 
UNACCEPTABLE BEHAVIOURS 
THAT CANNOT BE JUSTIFIED 
DEVIANCE THRESHOLD 
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Thirty behaviours were chosen for the card-sort activity. To choose the behaviours, 
a selection of the most commonly researched consumer behaviours were taken from 
the literature (see Freestone & Mitchell, 2004; Fullerton & Punj, 2004; Mitchell & 
Chan, 2002; Muncy & Vitell, 1992; Neale & Fullerton, 2010; Wilkes, 1978). Other 
behaviours were selected by the researcher to reflect more salient consumer issues in 
the current marketplace, as called for by Neale and Fullerton (2010). The researcher 
informally surveyed a convenience sample of consumers over 18 years of age, living 
in Australia, to ascertain what questionable or unacceptable consumer behaviours they 
were aware of in the marketplace. Behaviours chosen for inclusion in the study from 
the informal survey were selected based on their perceived degree of prevalence in the 
marketplace so that respondents were more likely to be vicariously or experientially 
familiar with the behaviour. Thirty behaviours were chosen as the maximum number 
of behaviours to sort before respondent fatigue occurred as evidenced in pilot testing 
of the card sort. See Appendix A for the 30 behaviour options used in this study. 
The population of interest was Australian consumers over 18 years old. Table 2 
summarises sample characteristics. Participants were recruited through non-
probability convenience, snowballing, and purposive sampling techniques, using age 
and gender, which have been found to influence perceptions of consumer behaviour 
(Genereux & McLeod, 1995; McMahon & Cohen, 2009). The researchers approached 
consumers they knew and participants snowballed from there. As the purpose of the 
research was to explore general perceptions of right and wrong consumer behaviours, 
there was no need to restrict the sample to individuals who had experience performing 
DCBs. Ethics approval was obtained from the researchers’ university. 
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Table 2. Sample Characteristics  
 
  
 
 
 
The interviews were audio recorded and transcribed. Participants first undertook a 
closed card-sort activity of 30 consumer behaviours, sorting into three pre-established 
categories: (1) acceptable behaviour, (2) questionable behaviour, and (3) unacceptable 
behaviour. The behaviour categorisations during the card sort were made depending 
on how the respondent perceived the specific behaviour. The card-sort activity 
facilitated the rest of the interview. Participants were subsequently asked how they 
described each of the behaviour categories. Participants were then presented with 
hypothetical scenarios involving a gender-neutral character engaging in a specific 
behaviour written on one of the cards. The participant needed to encourage and then 
subsequently deter the scenario character from engaging in that behaviour. The 
hypotheticals were repeated a number of times to get rich insight into the perceptions 
of right and wrong. Using a third-person character technique allowed the participant 
to transfer his or her own attitudes towards the third-person to explain that person’s 
behaviour (Zikmund, Ward, Lowe, Winzar, & Babin, 2011). Finally, participants 
ranked unacceptable behaviours to ascertain which was perceived as the most 
unacceptable. Participants then invented a hypothetical scenario of why, when two 
people faced with the same circumstance and background, one would engage in 
unacceptable behaviour yet the other would not. 
Age Males Females Total 
19-34 5 4 9 
35-50 4 5 9 
51-66 5 4 9 
67+ 1 1 2 
15 14 29 
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The data were analysed using thematic analysis following Turner’s (1981) seven 
stages approach, advocated by Reynolds and Harris (2009) and Harris and Daunt 
(2011) as appropriate for consumer deviance research. The card-sort activity was used 
in an exploratory capacity to facilitate the discussion of abstract concepts of right and 
wrong during the interview. An initial analysis was conducted on the card sort to 
identify the distribution of behaviours within each category: acceptable, questionable, 
and unacceptable behaviour. Appendix B has the results from the card sort, which 
highlight the variability in consumer perceptions. 
 
Results and discussion 
As well as confirming that five factors from the literature inform consumer 
perceptions, three additional factors were identified in the interview data. 
Collectively, the eight factors identified were official classification, perceived risk, 
norms, intent, perceived outcomes, perceived fairness, past experiences as victim, and 
moral identity. These are the factors that can inform a consumer’s deviance threshold 
– where consumers draw the line between right and wrong. When consumer 
preferences (e.g. to watch the latest movie) do not align with what consumers 
perceive as an acceptable behaviour (e.g. illegal downloading), consumers will draw 
on neutralisation techniques to position the DCB (e.g. illegal downloading) within 
their deviance threshold, enabling them to perform it without negatively updating 
their self-concept. 
In the findings, it was apparent that individuals placed emphasis on different 
factors in their perceptions of right and wrong. Hence, different behaviours took up 
different mental positions in individuals’ deviance thresholds. The factor an 
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individual placed most emphasis on (e.g. perceived outcomes) dictated the type of 
neutralisation technique used (e.g. denial of injury) to excuse the inclusion of DCBs 
in their deviance threshold that arguably did cause harm. Each of the eight factors 
identified in the data is discussed below, alongside a summary of the neutralisation 
techniques consumers use to justify their perceptions. 
 
Official classification 
This study found if a specific behaviour was consistent with the law and 
organisational policy, it was perceived as acceptable. However, not all behaviours 
violating their official classification were perceived as unacceptable behaviours: 
It’s [the law is] almost like implicit …in how you think what is right and 
what is wrong… the starting ground, that…probably categorises stuff 
straight away, and then —you can deviate from that or apply to that 
depending on the context. (#10) 
 
The neutralisation technique claim of entitlement was evident here, suggesting 
that the individual feels they have the right to get what they want, when they want it, 
and how they want it: 
[Using an expired coupon to buy merchandise] In my mind I sort of 
rationalise and think, well, if the retailer made this offer …I can 
understand they’ve put an expiry date to it, but, if I’m a day or two days 
late, I sort of feel like I’m being penalised ‘cause I didn’t want to 
purchase it in their time frame, in the retailer’s time frame.  Clearly, if 
they could sell me a widget yesterday for five bucks cheaper, then they 
could sell me the same widget for five bucks and there’re still making 
money on it. (#7) 
 
If consumers perceive the official classifications of behaviours to be guidelines 
that they can deviate from, the classifications will be less effective at controlling 
DCB. Reasons for deviating from the official classification depended on the factor 
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most salient in the consumer’s perceptions. For instance, the violation of hotel policy 
by lying about how many people were staying in a hotel room was considered 
acceptable when the extra guests were unintended guests; hence the intent factor was 
salient in those consumers’ deviance thresholds.  
The extent to which an individual places importance on the official 
classification of the behaviour dictates how important it is in their perception of right 
and wrong. However, unless the official classification is backed by formal 
punishment, it could become less significant in guiding perceptions of, and 
engagement in, DCB. This is explored further below in perceived risk. The findings 
around official classification support the inclusion of formal regulation in typologies 
and frameworks created to distinguish between types of DCBs (e.g. Moschis & Cox, 
1989; Muncy & Vitell, 1992; Fullerton & Punj, 2004; Amine & Giquel, 2011; Vitell 
& Muncy, 2005). 
 
Perceived risk 
Theoretically, perceived risk is an individual’s perception of the probability of 
being caught, the severity of punishment, and swiftness of punishment. The swiftness 
of punishment was not evident in the data, aligning with research in criminology 
(Nagin & Pogarsky, 2001). However, probability and severity of punishment were 
evident in the interview data. The perception of risk infers how important the official 
classification of a particular behaviour is in guiding an individual’s perceptions of, 
and engagement in DCB. If violation of the official classification of a given behaviour 
were backed by punishment, then the individual would perceive it to be high risk and 
would subsequently classify the behaviour as unacceptable: 
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I’d say the consequences are very serious and if they were to get caught, 
which there’s a good chance they will, because of the credit card 
companies- the policies they have in place and procedures, you will almost 
certainly get caught. (#1) 
 
… the police aren’t going to say “oh mate, you shouldn’t have done that” 
they’re just going to arrest you for stealing. So that’s the basic deterrent, 
that you’re going to get caught and there’ll be a penalty. (#19) 
 
However, consistent with existing research that most DCB goes undetected 
(Bandura, 1991a) perceptions of risk were usually low among participants. Low 
perceptions of risk undermine the credibility of the behaviour’s official classification 
by law and policy, making individuals perceive the behaviour to be acceptable, or at 
least questionable but still within their deviance threshold:  
I would think that they could get away with that because there’s nobody 
coming round to check, so it’s on their conscious [conscience] whether they 
bring four, six or what other people they want [lying about how many 
people are in the hotel room]. (#2) 
 
A neutralisation technique evident in the data was the justification by 
comparison technique, which compares behaviours against one another (Cromwell 
& Thurman, 2003), suggesting that a behaviour can be acceptable if the behaviour 
is not as bad as alternatives: 
The punishment may not even be enough to warrant not doing it, at least for 
the first time anyway…there’s a good chance he’ll get away with it…the 
punishment for doing something like that would be a lot less than if you 
went and robbed a grocery store. (#23) 
 
If individuals do not perceive they will get caught, the severity of the 
punishment becomes irrelevant, consistent with the theoretical propositions of 
perceived risk (Grasmick & Green, 1980). The low perceived probability of being 
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caught was used as a justification for why a behaviour could be perceived as 
acceptable, and why it could be performed. These low perceptions of risk suggest 
a new neutralisation technique, denial of punishment probability, which is used to 
justify the inclusion of certain behaviours within an individual’s deviance 
threshold because the threat of being punished is low: 
They’ve just got ridiculous rules…it’s something in their written 
policies but they never look at it. They never use it anyway. (#4) 
 
Current deterrence strategies in the marketplace make appeals to consumers to 
uphold the law or organisational policy, or appeal to the risk associated with 
performing a deviant act. The results so far suggest that this approach to deterrence is 
not the most effective, as the official classification and perceived risk associated with 
the behaviour were two of eight possible factors informing perceptions of right and 
wrong.  
 
Norms 
Norms were found to reflect a combination of an individual’s perceived 
prevalence of the behaviour and an individual’s subjective norms. If the behaviour 
was perceived to be prevalent, it was perceived to be acceptable. Consistent with 
social comparison theory (Festinger, 1954), individuals are driven to constantly 
evaluate their perceptions and behaviours against those of individuals similar to them, 
ultimately influencing their behaviour. In the data, conflict arose when participants 
perceived the prevalence of a behaviour to contradict the behaviour’s official 
classification, shifting the behaviour from being perceived as unacceptable to 
questionable – within the individual’s deviance threshold:  
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With [eating] grapes, it’s just okay, because you don’t want to buy 
something that’s bad, and that’s probably the one kind of fruit that you can 
do that with. You’re not going to bite an apple …, grapes are just easy…it’s 
acceptable because everyone else does it. (#13) 
 
Consistent with differential association theory (Sutherland, 1947), support from 
family and friends indicated what an individual deemed normative behaviour. If peers 
supported the behaviour, enactment of that behaviour would unlikely incur a social 
sanction and could possibly be rewarded. If peers do not support the behaviour, social 
sanctions are likely, indicating that the behaviour deviates from the norm and should 
be perceived as questionable or unacceptable. Placing emphasis on norms in 
perceptions of right and wrong means behaviours associated with social sanctions will 
fall outside of an individual’s deviance threshold. Participants recognised the role 
family and friends played in their perceptions of DCB: 
‘cause like my lawyer friends would just be like “that’s [not claiming 
an item at the self-checkout] unacceptable… I can’t be hanging 
around someone who does that”. (#4) 
 
They’re [family and friends] very judgmental. They would definitely 
have a reaction. They’d probably call me out on it, for sure. … 
literally question what I was doing and why I was doing it. (#13) 
 
These findings support past research that norms are used to classify behaviours as 
acceptable or unacceptable, but they can also be used as the justification of DCB 
(Davis, Johnson and Ohmer, 1998) through the use of the neutralisation technique 
normal practice (Henry, 1990) – ‘there’s the kind of societal view that hey everyone 
does it’ (#9), ‘acceptable because everyone else does it’ (#13), ‘I think it’s such a 
prevalent thing nowadays… so in that sense it’s questionable’ (#6).  
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Intent 
Intent refers to the intention of the individual engaging in the behaviour. Evidence 
of intent informing perceptions of right and wrong is consistent with Muncy and 
Vitell’s (1992) assumption that an individual’s classification of a behaviour reflects 
the extent to which the consumer is passive or active in performing the behaviour. 
When the intent was made clear during the interview, participants perceived 
intentional behaviours such as “intentionally taking someone else’s takeaway order” 
as unacceptable, in comparison to unknown intention such as “taking someone’s 
vegetarian meal at a conference”, which was perceived as questionable. Alternative 
examples were discussed: 
If someone was doing this [claiming an item as stolen to an insurance 
company to collect the money] all the time and they were claiming large 
amounts of money then I would feel more justified in putting it in the 
unacceptable pile because…they’re looking to make a profit from it. 
(#15) 
 
[Saying there are 2 people in your hotel room when really there are 4] If 
you deliberately set out to, you enter a contract and then you have every 
intention to get around it, then that’s not the right thing to do. But under 
certain circumstances, like things that aren’t planned … it’s a breach of 
contract but … I wouldn’t lose any sleep over it. (#19) 
 
Unintentional DCB reflected the denial of responsibility neutralisation technique: 
I hadn’t done it on purpose, I wasn’t trying to evade the fare. But I 
dropped my travel card. I had no money on me either. So I was 
upfront, I was honest with her and she said “well that’s fine”, she said, 
“something may happen at the other end but you just need to explain 
to them what you have explained to me.”  Because I said to them all 
you have do is ask me to provide you with statement and see I use my 
[travel card] every day. So that’s why I put it as a questionable. I 
wasn’t really evading the fare, but sometime shit happens and you 
know. (#12) 
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Good intentions were identified when discussing ‘creating a fake US iTunes 
account to access and pay for content not available in Australia’.  Participants 
believed this behaviour was acceptable, despite being illegal, because the company 
still received payment. Participants argued their intentions were good because they 
were finding a way to pay the company, while still getting access to the content they 
wanted: 
There’s still an intention to pay for what it is that you’re receiving. It’s 
still unacceptable because it’s contravening the policies and the laws 
that are underpinning, but in going through the transaction, you’re still 
paying for it. (#18) 
 
It’s not like you’re trying to falsify something so you don’t pay at all. 
You are willing to pay, you just can’t access it, so under that context I 
think that’s fine. (#28) 
 
The neutralisation technique defence of necessity was found where participants 
said they had no alternative – e.g. ‘they haven’t made it an option at all’ (#5). The 
justification by comparison technique is also used as the behaviour is deemed more 
acceptable than alternatives – e.g. ‘not like you’re trying to falsify something so you 
don’t pay at all’ (#28).  
 
Perceived outcomes 
The outcome dimensions evident in the data were direction and degree of harm, 
despite others being identified in the literature review. The direction of harm 
highlights the victim of the DCB. DCB can be directed towards an individual 
(employee, other consumers) or an organisation. When DCB is directed towards an 
individual, the behaviour is more likely to be perceived as unacceptable than if DCB 
was directed towards the organisation: 
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You tend to think that organisations can handle it more, like maybe they’ve 
got some funding set aside to handle things that you might do … individual 
people don’t generally have any kind of protection against that. And then 
there’s just the perception I suppose that companies don’t really have a 
human face…It’s being able to personally identify people that magnifies 
everything. (#5) 
 
The distinction between individuals and organisations is explained by the identifiable 
victim effect, such that the more identifiable the victim the less likely deviant acts will 
be directed towards them, due to the victim’s ability to engender empathy from the 
offender committing the deviant act (Jenni & Loewenstein, 1997), as evident below:  
I’ve been in a situation where a girl there, obviously part-time, gave 
me change for $50 instead of $10 or $20, and I thought, no, I gave it 
back because it’s a lot of difference and that particular person would 
be accountable at the end of the day on her till, and she’s only part-
time, you wouldn’t do it…I would give that money back, but if you 
kept it, that would be very questionable behaviour. (#6) 
 
When the victim is not identifiable, offenders will perceive no harm is being 
caused, thereby facilitating their deviant actions (Small & Loewenstein, 2003). While 
there was a distinction between individual and organisational victims, there was also a 
distinction between small and large organisations. This supports recent research 
findings that consumers are more willing to victimise large rather than small 
organisations (Fullerton, Neale & Dootson, 2014), as the consumer does not feel they 
are harming the large organisation (Fullerton & Punj, 1997).  
The neutralisation technique of denial of victim was evident for the factor 
direction of harm, with participants arguing the organisation deserved or could 
afford the harm the DCB caused:  
Look at the size of the store, what they’re charging, at the profits, 
excessive profits they’re making, like X and Y [two large grocery 
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stores] are doing it in a way that’s unacceptable as a duopoly so people 
will convince themselves that it’s acceptable to hit back. (#1) 
 
The degree of harm dimension of perceived outcomes focused on how much harm 
the individual perceived the behaviour would cause to others. The data suggest that 
harm was viewed as monetary, as opposed to emotional or physical. The greater the 
perceived harm, the more likely the participant would perceive the behaviour as 
unacceptable: 
[Impersonating someone else by using their credit card to purchase 
goods, without their permission]…you’re using someone else’s 
money. You didn’t earn that money so you don’t deserve to spend it.  I 
sit there and go, what goes through someone’s head to make them 
think that that’s acceptable? …it’s wrong on so many levels, you 
didn’t earn that money, it’s fraud. I know it happened to a few people 
and it’s cost them so much and they can’t pay their kids school fees 
…I just find it really inconsiderate and really unacceptable. (#9) 
 
 [drinking a soda in the grocery store and not paying for it] a can of 
soda is about three bucks so you deprive the supermarket of three 
dollars and it’s not that big a deal. Depending on the [public transport] 
fare, it could be two or three dollars as well, so that’s not that big a 
theft… Then you’ve got this dress or a power tool ... from my 
understanding dresses are at least a hundred dollars and power tools 
same [that’s unacceptable]. (#3) 
 
Participants had arbitrary definitions for what constituted enough harm to 
classify the behaviour as unacceptable, and to stop the individual from engaging 
in it. The variability in what participants perceived as an acceptable level of harm 
reflects their varying points of tolerance for DCB: 
If you’re going to a movie…that’s only a $5 thing…but then if you’re 
going to lie to save like $200 to go to a theme park, then it’s like 
maybe…I shouldn’t even be considering that activity, I should just be 
doing something else, rather than trying to lie to do it. (#10) 
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The degree of harm dimension of perceived outcomes was associated with the 
neutralisation technique denial of injury, in which participants argued that no one is 
being hurt by the individual’s DCB: 
Trying to get in to the Louvre or something like that, if I can save a couple 
of bucks by claiming that she’s a little bit younger, then it wasn’t going to 
be any skin off anybody’s nose particularly with thousands of people there a 
day. (#11) 
 
The more negative the perceived outcomes, based on the degree and direction of 
the harm, the more likely the individual would perceive the behaviour to be 
unacceptable – the limit of their deviance threshold.  
 
Perceived fairness 
As an extension on the conceptual dimensions identified in the literature review, 
perceived fairness refers to how fair an individual perceives a consumption situation 
to be, usually dictated by law, organisational policy, or the organisation’s conduct. 
This includes, but is not limited to, pricing, consumption constraints, and service 
quality. When a law, policy, or situation is perceived to be unfair, retaliatory DCBs 
are perceived to be acceptable if not justified. When discussing the behaviour ‘not 
saying anything when the waitress miscalculates the bill in your favour’, it was 
perceived as acceptable, if not questionable, if the service had been poor: 
If we’ve had terrible service, if the food’s been late and people haven’t been 
friendly…then you’re not providing essentially what you said you would, so 
I’ll claim a silent compensation for something like that [not saying anything 
when the waitress miscalculates the bill in your favour]. (#18) 
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Agnew’s (1992) strain theory suggests that an individual is more likely to react 
with DCB when the individual perceives a situation to be unfair. In that situation, an 
individual could seek DCB alternatives, when normative behaviour fails to achieve 
the individuals’ goals of fulfilling their consumer preferences. When constraints are 
placed on an individual’s consumption, the individual may not feel they had the right 
to choose their behaviours freely (Cialdini, Cacioppo, Bassett & Miller, 1978). This 
can prompt the use of the condemnation of the condemner’s neutralisation technique, 
shifting focus away from their own actions to the actions of the organisation: 
They just charge astronomical prices …but you’re going to do it if it 
means that your child has that opportunity to see a film…it’s not about 
beating the company, but it’s just showing them that…if you drop 
your prices people wouldn’t do these things… work with the people 
make it easier and more desirable…make the movie tickets slightly 
cheaper so everybody can go to the movies. (#12) 
 
Organisations facing this issue must seek to understand why the individual feels 
justified in their actions and must respond by either being transparent about the 
reasons behind the perceived unfair policy, or adjusting their business model to better 
meet the demands of their consumers.  
 
Past experiences as victim 
Another extension on the conceptual dimensions identified in the literature review 
includes past experiences as victim, which refers to an individual’s vicarious or actual 
experience as a victim of DCB. Past experiences restricted the inclusion of DCBs 
within an individual’s deviance threshold as being a past victim made them less 
tolerant of the DCB:  
[Claiming a purchase price is cheaper] I’ve been on the other side of 
that … I’ve been the person doing the selling and you can usually tell 
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when it’s happening …and I’d usually just tell them, ‘fine, go to the 
other shop and get it’, call them on their bluff… it is unacceptable and 
when I was in that position of selling, I wouldn’t compromise, 
knowing that they knew, if they’re not going to do their leg work, it’s 
their responsibility to if they want a cheaper price and a bargain. (#18) 
 
Individuals who perceived a close proximity (Jones, 1990) to the victim 
understood the harm resulting from the behaviour. These behaviours were therefore 
largely perceived as unacceptable and beyond the individual’s deviance threshold: 
 [Claiming a lost item as stolen to claim insurance] (a) my husband 
works for an insurance company, (b) I know people who have done 
that and it’s the wrong thing to do and they’ve done it several times on 
several different occasions. Not just are you giving misleading or false 
information to insurance companies, it really ticks me off because that 
impacts on my insurance premium. … it’s lying as well …it impacts 
on everybody else’s insurance premiums for something that you’ve 
done wrong. It’s not that anybody else has stolen your whatever, it’s 
that you’ve misplaced it somewhere. (#17) 
 
Unlike the factors discussed thus far, past experiences did not promote the use of a 
neutralisation technique to excuse DCB. Instead, it promoted use of the universal 
moral rule – ‘treat others as you wish to be treated’ explaining why some behaviours 
remain outside the individual’s deviance threshold. This maxim follows Kant’s (2002 
[1785], p. 37) categorical imperative “act only in accordance with that maxim through 
which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law”. The next factor, 
moral identity, had a similar effect of explaining why some behaviours are beyond the 
individual’s deviance threshold rather than excusing placement within the threshold. 
 
Moral identity  
Moral identity refers to the extent to which moral traits are a central and relatively 
stable part of an individual’s self-concept (Aquino & Reed, 2002). The more salient 
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the moral traits (e.g. honesty, kindness, caring, and compassion) in an individual’s 
self-concept, the more likely those traits will guide an individual’s perception of right 
and wrong. If enacting a behaviour was incongruent with an individual’s moral 
identity, then the behaviour was perceived to be unacceptable as it caused the 
individual to experience cognitive dissonance: 
On the inside of it I knew I was breaking my own values and core beliefs in 
what was right and wrong, so there was discomfort from that. (#18) 
 
Just generally anything that would make you feel guilty … and feeling the 
need to … find some justifiable reason for it. (#29) 
 
In the interviews, an activity was run to explore why when two people faced the 
same situation, one responds with DCB while the other does not. Participants 
unanimously agreed the saliency of an individual’s moral standards determined the 
likelihood of an individual performing a DCB: 
They’ve much stronger boundaries and moral compass than the other 
people. (#27) 
 
Stronger moral compass. Determined to get through something 
without resorting to the easiest means or the illegal means. (#8) 
 
These views suggest that moral identity could dictate an individual’s deviance 
threshold. If an individual places emphasis on their moral identity in their perception 
of right and wrong, they are likely to be less tolerant of DCB and less likely to engage 
in it (Aquino & Reed, 2002), thus finding a more inelastic deviance threshold. 
However, past research has demonstrated that individuals with a weak moral identity 
can be affected by moral triggers that raise the saliency of moral traits (e.g. honesty), 
if only temporarily, to prevent or reduce instances of deviance. Mazar et al. (2008) 
demonstrated that students who were asked to write down as many of the Ten 
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Commandments as they could recall, were less likely to cheat than students who were 
not asked to write down the Ten Commandments before completing a series of maths 
matrices. This result was reached regardless of the student’s religion and regardless of 
how many Commandments were correctly recalled, suggesting that the moral 
reminder of the Ten Commandments was enough to trigger the individual’s moral 
identity to reduce cheating. Shu, Mazar, Gino, Ariely, and Bazerman (2012) triggered 
honesty, the primary trait for a moral identity (Aquino & Reed, 2002), by asking 
people to sign at the beginning of their insurance claim form declaring the 
information they were about to disclose was honest. This is in comparison to typical 
insurance claim forms (or even tax file forms) that ask individuals to sign at the end 
of the form once any dishonesty has been performed, declaring the information is 
honest. Signing at the beginning of the form saw a reduction in fraudulent insurance 
claims (Shu et al., 2012). Hence, an individual with a low or high moral identity can 
still have moral traits (e.g. honesty) made salient to nudge their behaviour, and, if 
only temporarily, alter their perceived deviance threshold. 
To summarise, the findings suggest that a number of factors can influence an 
individual’s deviance threshold. Table 3illustrates these factors and the corresponding 
neutralisation techniques used. Individuals who place most emphasis on norms in 
their perceptions of right and wrong will likely use the neutralisation technique of 
normal practice to justify their perceptions of a DCB, allowing behaviours like illegal 
downloading to fall within their deviance threshold. Engaging in illegal downloading 
would then be a DCB that an individual can perform without negatively updating their 
self-concept, given their ability to justify its position within their deviance threshold. 
Conversely, other individuals may place emphasis on perceived fairness in their 
perceptions of right and wrong, suggesting that they will use the condemnation of 
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condemners or claim of entitlement techniques. Actively underpaying for a service 
may be outside an individual’s deviance threshold. However, reliance on perceived 
fairness as informing their perceptions of right and wrong could mean that not saying 
anything when the waitress miscalculates your bill is justified when the service is 
poor. The ability to justify DCB means the behaviour then falls within the 
individual’s deviance threshold, allowing them to do it and maintain a positive self-
concept. The implications of these findings will now be discussed.  
 
Table 3. Factors informing perceptions with corresponding neutralisation techniques  
Factor informing perceptions of 
right and wrong 
Associated neutralisation 
technique 
Source of neutralisation 
technique 
Official classification* Claim of entitlement Coleman, 1994; McGregor, 
2008 
Perceived risk Justification by comparison 
Denial of punishment 
probability 
Cromwell & Thurman, 2003 
Identified in this paper 
Norms Normal practice Coleman, 1994; Henry, 1990 
Intent Denial of responsibility 
Defence of necessity 
Sykes & Matza, 1957 
Minor, 1981 
 Justification by comparison Cromwell & Thurman, 2003 
Perceived outcomes 
(a) Direction of harm 
 
 
Denial of victim  
 
 
Sykes & Matza, 1957 
 
(b) Degree of harm Denial of injury Sykes & Matza, 1957 
Past experiences as victim ‘Treat others as you wish to 
be treated’ 
These factors offered 
justifications ‘against’ rather 
than ‘for’ DCB. Moral identity ‘Not what a good person does’ 
Perceived fairness Condemnation of the 
condemners  
Sykes & Matza, 1957 
 
Table 3 footnote: *Justifications used to deviate from the official classification of the behaviour depend 
on which of the other factors is most salient in their perceptions, e.g. if ‘direction of harm’ is most 
salient, then the individual will likely use the denial of victim technique. 
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Implications, limitations, and future research 
This research was driven by two aims: first, to explore the factors informing an 
individual’s deviance threshold and second, to understand how the factors informing 
individuals’ deviance thresholds influence the types of neutralisation techniques 
consumers use to justify their perceptions of DCB. In addressing the first aim of the 
research, the research in this paper provides empirical evidence for conceptual 
dimensions suggested in a number of frameworks and typologies that distinguish 
behaviours in their degree of wrongness (e.g. Wilkes, 1978) and ethicality (e.g. Neale 
& Fullerton, 2010; Vitell & Muncy, 2005). While descriptive research can quantify 
the extent to which behaviour is perceived as acceptable or ethical on rating scales, 
the research in this paper explains why such perceptions exist. While official 
classification, norms, perceived risk, intent, and perceived outcomes were suggested 
in the literature as distinguishing between behaviours, evidence was also found for 
past experience as the victim, moral identity, and perceived fairness. An individual’s 
deviance threshold is thus a function of these eight factors identified in this paper, and 
the weightings each individual places on each of the eight factors.  
The deviance threshold is a novel concept in consumer behaviour research to 
explain perceptions of DCBs. Without rich understanding of consumers’ perceptions, 
marketing strategies used to deter DCBs remain based on traditional deterrence 
mechanisms appealing to risk and official classifications. The findings in this paper, 
however, show evidence for additional factors informing consumer perceptions of 
right and wrong. As individuals seem to place a varying degree of importance on a 
varying number of factors in their perceptions of right and wrong, it is recommended 
that a “one-size-fits-all approach to deterrence” is abandoned, in line with 
criminology research on criminal deterrence strategies (Worrall, et al.  2014, p. 341). 
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Alternative deterrence strategies, driven by these results, are thus provided in the 
practical implications section below.  
In addressing the second aim of this paper, this research found the salient factor 
informing an individual’s deviance threshold informs the type of neutralisation 
technique they use. This neutralisation technique then enables individuals to justify 
the mental placement of behaviours within their deviance threshold. Official 
classification, norms, perceived risk, intent, perceived outcomes, and perceived 
fairness are factors linked to neutralisation techniques that enable DCBs to be 
mentally placed within an individual’s deviance threshold. Past experience as victim 
and moral identity, were two factors not associated with a neutralisation technique. 
Instead, they provided an explanation for keeping behaviours outside of an 
individual’s deviance threshold, as enactment of those behaviours would create too 
much dissonance, and would thus require the individual to negatively update their 
self-concept.  
These findings extend on existing research into which neutralisation techniques 
are employed for specific behaviours, and the timing of their use pre- and post- 
performing the behaviour (e.g. Harris & Daunt, 2011; Harris & Dumas, 2009; Vitell, 
2003). While the data provided additional empirical support for the use of justification 
by comparison, normal practice, denial of responsibility, defence of necessity, denial 
of victim, denial of injury, and condemnation of the condemners, new empirical 
support was found for the claim of entitlement technique. While claim of entitlement 
has previously been tested in white-collar crime, it was conceptually proposed yet 
empirically untested in the consumer context (McGregor, 2008). Our research extends 
on McGregor’s (2008) work finding evidence for use of the claim of entitlement 
neutralisation technique in the consumer context. Another justification that emerged 
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was the denial of punishment probability technique, associated with the low 
perceptions of risk for most DCBs. The denial of punishment probability technique 
can be explained by Sunstein’s (2003) concept of probability neglect, whereby 
individuals fail to focus on the probability of an event and instead focus on the 
positive or negative outcomes of a behaviour.  
While the research provides rich insights about a phenomenon, it is limited in the 
generalisability of findings (Zikmund et al., 2011). Culturally this research only 
reflects views of Australian consumers. While Neale & Fullerton (2010) highlight that 
the UK and US closely align in perceptions of ethicality with Australian consumers, 
cultural validation is an opportunity for future research. Moreover, the research 
requires quantitative validation. An opportunity exists to combine the factors 
identified in this study with existing insights into the types of consumers who have 
more favourable beliefs towards DCB, to generalise the findings of what factors are 
being used. For instance, future research could empirically quantify the weightings 
high Machiavellian, low religiosity, high relativistic, young males place on the factors 
identified in this study, as this group has been found to be more tolerant of DCB (Pan 
& Sparks, 2012; Vitell, 2003). Understanding what factors this group places emphasis 
on will provide marketers with information to develop more informed deterrence 
strategies, targeted at the justification techniques used by those who are more tolerant 
towards DCB.  
As traditional deterrence strategies rely on high perceptions of risk, and taking 
into account the financial and economic constraints of businesses, future research 
should consider the role for alternative deterrence strategies as discussed below. 
This research offers actionable insights for marketing practitioners through more 
informed strategies to encourage the consumer to perform behaviours the organisation 
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desires, while deterring DCBs. For instance, designing a campaign to humanise a 
large organisations and leverage the identifiable victim effect, giving a ‘face’ to an 
organisation, makes it more difficult for the consumer to justify deviant acts at the 
expense of the organisation. Thus, the denial of victim technique is challenged, as the 
victim is made known. A step further would be to make the harm incurred by the 
organisation visible to the consumer, to further deter deviant acts. Such an approach 
aids to reduce the social distance between the consumer and the organisation, and 
challenge the perceived positive outcomes of performing the deviant act.  
The normal practice technique could be challenged through the use of social 
proofs, for consumers who place emphasis on norms in their perceptions of deviance. 
Social proofs persuade individuals to perform a desired behaviour by suggesting peer 
or social group engagement in that behaviour (Goldstein, Cialdini and Griskevicius, 
2008). However, the behaviour being promoted must be engaged in by the majority, 
otherwise the strategy ends up promoting the undesirable behaviour (Cialdini et al. 
2006). Similar strategies have been used to encourage voter turnout and promote 
environmentally friendly behaviours (Goldstein et al., 2008; Gerber & Rogers, 2009). 
An opportunity exists to test this approach in the DCB context. 
Emphasis on self-regulation when organisations create deterrence strategies is 
recommended, reflecting the effect of moral identity on perceptions of DCB. To 
access self-regulation, organisations need to activate an individual’s objective self-
awareness of their own moral traits, which can be done using moral triggers as 
explored in work by Mazar et al. (2008) and Shu et al. (2012) discussed above, such 
as signing at the beginning of a form to declare honesty. Increasing the saliency of 
moral values such as honesty, even temporarily, can reduce the likelihood of DCB 
(Mazar et al., 2008). This means a strategy based on appealing to one’s moral identity 
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is effective for those with a strong moral identity, as honesty is already salient to the 
individual’s self-concept, and for those with a weak moral identity as the honesty 
moral value is temporarily triggered for this group. 
Finally, these insights offer researchers some understanding of the social 
expectations that consumers maintain and use to define appropriate behaviour (Romer 
& Hornik, 1992) within the marketplace. Future research would benefit from 
quantifying the degree of social consensus on these perceptions. With individuals 
placing varying degrees of importance on a varying number of factors, informing 
varying types of neutralisation techniques, future research needs to examine the extent 
to which individual subjective definitions of right and wrong vary across society. 
Examining the extent of social consensus on DCB will provide evidence for 
discrepancies in societal level perceptions, which has implications for how DCB is 
policed. The official classification of the behaviour (law or policy) relies on the 
assumption there’s social consensus in the behaviour’s perceived wrongness. Low 
social consensus in how consumers perceive right and wrong will provide additional 
support for the argument that more tailored approaches to deterrence need to be 
explored in the consumer setting.  
This paper adds to the consumer deviance and consumer ethics bodies of 
literature by offering a novel concept – the deviance threshold – to explain consumer 
perceptions of right and wrong. The findings empirically validate and extend on 
conceptual dimensions used in a number of frameworks and typologies to 
distinguish behaviours based on their perceived acceptability. Additionally, the 
findings extend on neutralisation research by offering an explanation for why specific 
techniques are used and how they affect mental placement of behaviours within and 
beyond an individual’s deviance threshold. Finally, this research recommends the 
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abandonment of a universal approach to deterrence strategies in the consumer setting, 
as recently called for in criminology research (Worrall et al., 2014), because of the 
variability in consumers’ deviance thresholds. Practically, this research offers 
alternative deterrence strategies that go beyond reliance on appeals to upholding the 
law/policy, and appeals to the risk of punishment.  
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Appendix A 
Behaviours used in the card sort activity 
Behaviour Source 
Using the 4 cents fuel voucher from the grocery 
store to buy petrol 
This study 
Taping a movie off the television Mitchell & Chan, 2002; Muncy & Vitell, 1992; Vitell & Muncy, 2005 
Buying movie tickets online to jump the queue at 
the cinemas 
This study 
Only buying products from companies if you are 
part of their loyalty programs 
This study 
Spending over an hour trying on different t-shirts 
and not purchasing any 
Muncy & Vitell, 1992; Vitell & Muncy, 2005 
Claim a purchase price is better at a competing 
retailer in order to get a discount 
Neale & Fullerton, 2010 
Tasting grapes in a supermarket and not buying 
any 
Mitchell & Chan, 2002; Muncy & Vitell, 1992; 
Wilkes, 1978 
Creating a fake US iTunes account to access and 
pay for content not available in Australia 
This study 
Returning merchandise to a store by claiming it 
was a gift when it was not 
Muncy & Vitell, 1992; Vitell & Muncy, 2005 
Illegally downloading TV shows from the internet 
for free, for personal consumption 
Fullerton & Punj, 2004; Freestone & Mitchell, 
2004; Vitell & Muncy, 2005 
Creating a fake account on social networking site This study 
Using an expired coupon for merchandise Fullerton & Punj, 2004; Muncy & Vitell, 1992; Vitell & Muncy, 2005; Wilkes, 1978 
Return used goods for a refund Neale & Fullerton, 2010; Wilkes, 1978 
Purchasing organs for transplant over the internet Freestone & Mitchell, 2004 
Lying about a child's age in order to get a lower 
price 
Mitchell & Chan, 2002; Muncy & Vitell, 1992; 
Vitell & Muncy, 2005; Neale & Fullerton, 2010 
Saying there are only 2 people staying in a 
holiday apartment when there are really 4 
This study 
Not saying anything when the waitress 
miscalculates the bill in your favour 
Mitchell & Chan, 2002; Muncy & Vitell, 1992; 
Vitell & Muncy, 2005; Neale & Fullerton, 2010; 
Wilkes, 1978 
Cutting in front of someone in a queue Mitchell & Chan, 2002; Fullerton & Punj, 2004 
Breaking a bottle of salad dressing in a 
supermarket and doing nothing about it 
Muncy & Vitell, 1992 
Taking someone's vegetarian meal at a conference This study 
Giving misleading price information to a clerk for 
an un-priced item 
Mitchell & Chan, 2002; Muncy & Vitell, 1992; 
Vitell & Muncy, 2005 
Reporting a lost item as 'stolen' to an insurance 
company to collect the money 
Mitchell & Chan, 2002; Muncy & Vitell, 1992; 
Vitell & Muncy, 2005; Neale & Fullerton, 2010 
Buying items for single use, and then returning 
them 
Fullerton & Punj, 2004; Wilkes, 1978 
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Behaviour Source 
Evading fare on public transport This study 
Intentionally taking someone else's takeaway 
order 
This study 
Drinking a can of soda in a supermarket without 
paying for it 
Muncy & Vitell, 1992; Vitell & Muncy, 2005; 
Wilkes, 1978 
Changing price-tags on merchandise in a retail 
store 
Mitchell & Chan, 2002; Fullerton & Punj, 2004; 
Muncy & Vitell, 1992; Wilkes, 1978 
Not claiming an item when buying groceries 
through the self-checkout 
This study; Wilkes, 1978 (shoplifting) 
Impersonating someone else by using their credit 
card to purchase goods on the internet without 
permission 
Mitchell & Chan, 2002; Freestone & Mitchell, 
2004 
Using stolen credit cards to order goods over the 
internet 
Mitchell & Chan, 2002; Freestone & Mitchell, 
2004 
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Appendix B. Card sort results 
Source Behaviour Number of times it appeared in a category 
Acceptable Questionable Unacceptable 
This study Using the 4 cents 
fuel voucher from 
the grocery store to 
buy petrol 
29 100% 0 0% 0 0% 
Mitchell & 
Chan, 2002; 
Muncy & 
Vitell, 1992; 
Vitell & 
Muncy, 2005 
Taping a movie off 
the television 
26 90% 2 7% 1 3% 
This study Buying movie 
tickets online to 
jump the queue at 
the cinemas 
26 90% 3 10% 0 0% 
This study Only buying 
products from 
companies if you are 
part of their loyalty 
programs 
25 86% 4 14% 0 0% 
Muncy & 
Vitell, 1992; 
Vitell & 
Muncy, 2005 
Spending over an 
hour trying on 
different t-shirts and 
not purchasing any 
22 76% 6 21% 1 3% 
Neale & 
Fullerton, 2010 
Claim a purchase 
price is better at a 
competing retailer in 
order to get a 
discount 
15 52% 9 31% 5 17% 
Mitchell & 
Chan, 2002; 
Muncy & 
Vitell, 1992; 
Wilkes, 1978 
Tasting grapes in a 
supermarket and not 
buying any 
12 41% 10 34% 7 24% 
This study Creating a fake US 
iTunes account to 
access and pay for 
content not available 
in Australia 
9 31% 13 45% 7 24% 
Muncy & 
Vitell, 1992; 
Vitell & 
Muncy, 2005 
Returning 
merchandise to a 
store by claiming it 
was a gift when it 
was not 
7 24% 13 45% 9 31% 
Fullerton & 
Punj, 2004; 
Freestone & 
Mitchell, 2004; 
Vitell & 
Illegally 
downloading TV 
shows from the 
internet for free, for 
7 24% 9 31% 13 45% 
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Source Behaviour Number of times it appeared in a category 
Acceptable Questionable Unacceptable 
Muncy, 2005 personal 
consumption 
This study Creating a fake 
account on social 
networking site 
4 14% 12 41% 13 45% 
Fullerton & 
Punj, 2004; 
Muncy & 
Vitell, 1992; 
Vitell & 
Muncy, 2005; 
Wilkes, 1978 
Using an expired 
coupon for 
merchandise 
3 10% 16 55% 10 34% 
Neale & 
Fullerton, 
2010; Wilkes, 
1978 
Return used goods 
for a refund 
3 10% 11 38% 15 52% 
Freestone & 
Mitchell, 2004 
Purchasing organs 
for transplant over 
the internet 
1 3% 16 55% 12 41% 
Mitchell & 
Chan, 2002; 
Muncy & 
Vitell, 1992; 
Vitell & 
Muncy, 2005; 
Neale & 
Fullerton, 2010 
Lying about a child's 
age in order to get a 
lower price 
1 3% 15 52% 13 45% 
This study Saying there are 
only 2 people 
staying in a holiday 
apartment when 
there are really 4 
1 3% 16 55% 12 41% 
Mitchell & 
Chan, 2002; 
Muncy & 
Vitell, 1992; 
Vitell & 
Muncy, 2005; 
Neale & 
Fullerton, 
2010; Wilkes, 
1978 
Not saying anything 
when the waitress 
miscalculates the bill 
in your favour 
1 3% 11 38% 17 59% 
Mitchell & 
Chan, 2002; 
Fullerton & 
Punj, 2004 
Cutting in front of 
someone in a queue 
1 3% 6 21% 22 76% 
Muncy & 
Vitell, 1992 
Breaking a bottle of 
salad dressing in a 
supermarket and 
doing nothing about 
it 
0 0% 11 38% 18 62% 
This study Taking someone's 0 0% 10 34% 19 66% 
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Source Behaviour Number of times it appeared in a category 
Acceptable Questionable Unacceptable 
vegetarian meal at a 
conference 
Mitchell & 
Chan, 2002; 
Muncy & 
Vitell, 1992; 
Vitell & 
Muncy, 2005 
Giving misleading 
price information to 
a clerk for an un-
priced item 
0 0% 7 24% 22 76% 
Mitchell & 
Chan, 2002; 
Muncy & 
Vitell, 1992; 
Vitell & 
Muncy, 2005; 
Neale & 
Fullerton, 2010 
Reporting a lost item 
as 'stolen' to an 
insurance company 
to collect the money 
0 0% 5 17% 24 83% 
Fullerton & 
Punj, 2004; 
Wilkes, 1978 
Buying items for 
single use, and then 
returning them 
0 0% 3 10% 26 90% 
This study Evading fare on 
public transport 
0 0% 3 10% 26 90% 
This study Intentionally taking 
someone else's 
takeaway order 
0 0% 3 10% 26 90% 
Muncy & 
Vitell, 1992; 
Vitell & 
Muncy, 2005; 
Wilkes, 1978 
Drinking a can of 
soda in a 
supermarket without 
paying for it 
0 0% 2 7% 27 93% 
Mitchell & 
Chan, 2002; 
Fullerton & 
Punj, 2004; 
Muncy & 
Vitell, 1992; 
Wilkes, 1978 
Changing price-tags 
on merchandise in a 
retail store 
0 0% 2 7% 27 93% 
This study; 
Wilkes, 1978 
(shoplifting) 
Not claiming an item 
when buying 
groceries through the 
self-checkout 
0 0% 0 0% 29 100% 
Mitchell & 
Chan, 2002; 
Freestone & 
Mitchell, 2004 
Impersonating 
someone else by 
using their credit 
card to purchase 
goods on the internet 
without permission 
0 0% 0 0% 29 100% 
Mitchell & 
Chan, 2002; 
Freestone & 
Mitchell, 2004 
Using stolen credit 
cards to order goods 
over the internet 
0 0% 0 0% 29 100% 
 
